The Information utility and social choice
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The Information utility and social choice papers prepared for a conference sponsored jointly by the University of Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica and the American Federation of Information Processing Soci[e]ties. by

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Published by AFIPS Press in Montvale, N.J .
Written in English


  • Communication -- Social aspects -- Congresses

Book details:

Edition Notes

Includes bibliographical references.

StatementEdited by H. Sackman and Norman Nie.
ContributionsSackman, Harold, ed., Nie, Norman H. ed., University of Chicago., Encyclopaedia Britannica., American Federation of Information Processing Societies.
LC ClassificationsHM258 .I49
The Physical Object
Pagination299 p.
Number of Pages299
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL4767600M
LC Control Number78129364

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  Social choice theory is a branch of mathematical social science that tries to make general statements about all such institutions. Given the diversity of potential institutions, the power of social choice theory may be quite limited, and indeed its . Chapter Social Choice Theory Felix Munoz-Garcia School of Economic Sciences Washington State University1 1 Introduction In this chapter, we consider a society with I 2 individuals, each of them endowed with his own preference relation over a set of alternatives, such as the political candidates running for o¢ ce, or. We start by considering the expected utility model, which dates back to Daniel Bernoulli in the 18th century and was formally developed by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern () in their book Theory of Games and Economic Be-havior. Remarkably, they viewed the development of the expected utility . The Canadian marketing manager for Schick razors recently launched its first e-mail campaign that was targeted to both men and women. Schick gave Xtreme III razors to customers who agreed to share information about their shaving habits. For sharing their information, customers were sent updates about other new products and promotions.

Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a choice theory dates from Condorcet's formulation of the voting paradox. The utility-maximization approach to choice has several characteristics that help account for its long and continuing dominance in economic analysis. First, from its earliest development, it has been deeply attached to principles of govern-ment policy making. The original utilitarian program proved to . UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PROBLEMS, Tenth Edition, progresses from a micro to macro level of analysis, focusing first on problems related to health care, drugs and alcohol, families, and crime, and then broadening to the larger issues of poverty and inequality, population growth, aging, environmental problems, and conflict around the world. A third choice would involve more leisure and the same income at point C (that is, /3 hours of work multiplied by the new wage of $12 per hour equals $ of total income). A fourth choice would involve less income and much more leisure at a point like D, with a choice like 50 hours of leisure, 20 hours of work, and $ in income.